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Abstract 
Studies on the causes of income differences between the rich and the poor have received an 
extensive attention in the inequality empirics. While ethnic diversity hasalso been identified 
as one of the fundamental causes of income inequality, the role of institutions as a mediating 
factor in the ethnicity-inequality nexus has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. To 
this end, this study complements the existing literature by investigating the extent to which 
institutional framework corrects the noisy influence originating from the nexus between 
“ethnic diversity” and inequality in 26 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1996-
2015. The empirical evidence is based on pooled OLS, fixed effects and system GMM 
estimators. The main findings reveal that the mediating influences of institutional 
settingsaredefective, thus making it extremely difficult to modulatethe noisy impacts of 
ethno-linguistic and religious heterogeneity on inequality. In addition, the negative 
influencesorchestrated by ethnolinguistic and religious diversities on inequality fail 
toattenuate the impact of income disparityeven when interacted with institutions. On the 
policy front, institutional reforms tailored toward economic, political and institutional 
governances should be targeted. 
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1.0 Introduction 
For many decades, researchers, policy pundits and other stakeholders alike have had, and still 
continue to contend with the mind-boggling questions that center on: what causes income 
differentials between the rich and the poor? What explains the nature of unequal societies in 
terms of outcomes and opportunities? Why are the rich countries continue getting richer and 
the poor countries also getting poorer? Does inequality concernideologically-inclined or 
locational specific in nature? How do we measure inequality? These and many more 
questions continue to trail the phenomenon of inequality in the empirical literature.While 
many factors such as: level of economic development (Kuznets, 1955; Alderson and Nielsen, 
2002; Dincer and Gunalp, 2012), demographic variables (Deaton and Paxson, 1997; Liu and 
Lawell, 2015), human capital development (Crenshaw and Ameen, 1994; Barro, 2000; 
Dabla-Norris et al., 2015), natural resources (Buccellatto and Alessandrini, 2009; Mallaye et 
al., 2014), size of government (Odedokun and Round, 2004; Anyanwu, 2011; Claus et al., 
2012), globalization (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; IMF, 2007; Sturm and De Haan, 2015), 
among others, have been offered as proximate causes, on the one hand, there are still some 
other salient factors whose impacts have, either been taken for granted, or inadvertently 
omitted in the empirical literature but deserve to be accordeddue consideration, on the other 
hand. Onesuch factor is the role of ethnic diversity which has been grossly undermined, or at 
best, given scanty research attention. Ethnic diversity was not accorded any formal 
recognition until seminal contribution of Easterly and Levine (1997). Thus, underrating the 
supposed ramifying impacts of ethnic diversity can be costly as it has been documented to 
have widespread implications for socioeconomic and political outcomes. Some of the 
associated, documented impacts include:causing political instability and conflict (Easterly 
2001; Buhaug, 2006); leading to low provision of public goods (Miguel and Gugerty 2005; 
Kimenyi, 2006); engendering high inequality (Barr and Oduro 2002; Milanovic, 2003); and 
more importantly, it has been held responsible for Africa’s low economic growth (Easterly 
and Levine 1997; Posner 2004a). Hence, it is not surprising that the centrality of the 
phenomenon on the continent has been aptly summarized in the words of Meles Zenawi (the 
former Ethiopian Prime Minister) as follows: 
“-----ethnic, religious and other sources of diversity are the hallmarks of African 
societies and rent seeking in our economies is not a more or less important 
phenomenon as would be the case in most economies. It is the centerpiece of our 
economies” 
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Following the above quotation, it is doubtless that ethnic heterogeneity2  has a profound 
impact on the African continent. Specifically, it has been argued to limit the tendency to 
redistribute income (See, Glaeser, 2005). The assertion has been further buttressed by Alesina 
and Glaeser (2004) who averred that individuals who belong to one ethnic group are less 
willing to support redistribution helping other ethnic groups. This is particularly so, as 
members of different ethnic groups simply view one another as direct competitors for scarce 
economic resources (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Alesina and 
Ferrara’s (2005) hypothesis also stressed that the members of the non-majority ethnic groups 
tend to derive positive utility from interacting with the members of the same ethnic group and 
negative utility from interacting with the members of the majority ethnic group. Going 
forward, other forms of diversity like language, race and religion have equally been 
documented to exacerbating inequality problems as recent research have suggested. Desmet 
et al.(2012)have attributedcross-country differences in income redistribution to ethno-
linguistic and religious fractionalization. According to Becker (1957), individuals tend to 
have stronger feelings of empathy toward their own group. This implicatively suggests 
countries with strong fractionalization often exhibit lower levels of redistribution. 
In another strand of literature, Acemoglu (2003) have specially crafted roles for geography 
and institutions as fundamental causes of differences in prosperity between countries. While 
the import of the former has been floored on the ground of not necessarily suggesting 
causation in spite of its higher correlational value with country’s prosperity on the one hand, 
the latter factoris considered as having a critical causal relation with country’s prosperity on 
the other hand.This, he defended by arguing that having good institutions encourage 
investment in machinery, human capital, and better technologies, whichcould consequently 
launch countries on the trajectory of prosperity. As a consequence, sound institutions that 
give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant freedom 
from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services might possibly 
constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group3 ordiversity of any form could do to 
another. In this light, institutions offer an environment that helps facilitate effective 
interaction between ethno-lingustic and religious fractionalization and inequality if well 
structured. It is startling, however, to note that whilestudies still exist in the empirical 
literature on the ethnic diversity-inequality linkage, on the one hand (Milanovic, 2003; 
                                                          
2
  Ethnic diversity and ethnic heterogeneity is being used interchangeably. 
3
 This is well exposited in Easterly (2001). 
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Glaeser, 2005; and Dincer and Lambert, 2006), the moderating role of a sound institutional 
framework on its identified adverse consequences has hardly been given the priorityit 
deserves on the other hand. To this end, the pertinent questions then remain: To what extent 
caninstitutional infrastructure corrects the noisy influence originating from ethnic diversity-
inequality nexus for a developing region like the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)? Are there causal 
connections in their relationship? Proffering answers to foregoing questions remain the focal 
targets the paper seeks to unveil. 
This paper specifically focuses on SSA as a candidate region based onthe following 
considerations. (i)Many of the countries in the region are ethnically heterogeneousin nature. 
For instance, Nigeria alone has over 250 ethnic groups. It is instructive to state that empirical 
findings have shown an African dummy variableregarding ethnic diversity to be statistically 
significant (see Michalopoulos 2008; Ahlerup and Olsson 2009). It has been further 
confirmed thatAfrica’s standard deviation in the number of ethnic groups per country is more 
than 35% higher than any other region. (ii)The region has been confirmed as having the 
highest levels of inequality both in terms of income and gender (see, Regional Economic 
Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa, 20164). (iii) The sub-region is also largely characterized by 
dysfunctional institutions (Ajide and Raheem, 2016). This has largely manifested on the 
negative values of each component of institutional index at least for the region as noted in 
World Governance Indicators’ Database. 
In the light of the above apparent policy syndrome of inequality and the established role of 
institutions in reducing poverty, income inequality and ethnic inequality, it is policy relevant 
to complement existing literature by assessing how institutions modulate the effect ethnic 
diversity on inequality. The position of the study departs from recent literature on inclusive 
development which has focused on inter alia: wage inequality and employment protection 
(Perugini and Pompei, 2016); views  on sustainable and inclusive development in emerging 
markets (Stiglitz, 2016); optimal redistribution and economic inequality via taxation (Yunker, 
2016); gender equality (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2009; Anyanwu, 2013a; Elu and 
Loubert, 2013; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Anyanwu, 2014a), the redistributive effect of 
regulation in developing nations (Atsu and Adams, 2015); rural-urban inequality 
(Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz, 2005), poverty nexuses (Anyanwu, 2013b, 2014b), relationships 
between finance, poverty, employment and economic growth (Odhiambo, 2009, 2011), 
                                                          
4
 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared by a team led by Céline Allard under 
the direction of AbebeAemro Selassie. 
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nexuses between human development, information technology and inclusive development 
(Gosavi, 2017; Minkoua Nzie  et al., 2017; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2018) and the 
relevance of finance in poverty mitigation (Odhiambo, 2010a, 2010b, 2013). 
Apart from the introductory section in one, the remaining sections are structured as follows. 
Section 2 covers stylized facts on ethnic diversity and inequality, while Section 3 discusses 
the relevant literature. The data and methodology are presented in Section 4. The results are 
disclosed and discussed in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes with implications and future 
research directions. 
 
2.0 Conceptual Relationship Between Ethnic Diversity and Inequality 
This section focuses on the interrelationships in ethnic diversity-inequality and institutional 
infrastructurediscourse for ease of appreciation of the conceptual linkages underlying the trio. 
It also discusses the key indices of ethnic diversity as well as the measure of inequality (Gini 
coefficients) of countries within the SSA region. 
2.1 Conceptual Framework for analyzing linkages between Ethnic Diversity, 
Inequality and Institutions 
The flowchart below (Figure 1) depicts conceptual linkages underpining ethnic diversity- 
inequality and institutional frameworkrelationships in a typical economic system. From the 
chart, it can be discerned that various factors seemed to affect inequality but in somewhat 
varying degrees. These factors include: demographic factors (e.g. like urbanization share of 
children in the population, share of elderly in the population, education levels, education 
inequality etc); macroeconomic factors (inflation, unemployment, financial development, 
foreign investments etc); environmental factors (natural resources); cultural and political 
factors (ethnic diversity, racial diversity, language and religious diversity) as well as omnibus 
factors (those of other factors outside the earlier mentioned ones). As indicated by solid and 
broken lines, while the impact of the former can directlyimpact on inequality on the one 
hand, the effect of the latter can be transmitted indirectlyvia institutions thus justifying the 
useful role of institutions as a modulator in the set-up, on the other hand. 
Of a particular concern however, is the impact of ethnic diversity–a byproduct of cultural and 
political factors- on inequality. As can be observed from the diagram, diversityis capable of 
influencing the distribution of income among the various competitors, who are, often time, 
divided along racial, ethnic, language and religion dimensions. However, the question of who 
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gets what or how the pie is being shared and distributed appeared to be largely moderated by 
the institutional framework in existence. On the diagram, the institutional framework 
occupies the center stage where all other originating arrows from other sources are indirectly 
impacted. The inequality might end up skewing toward one direction than the other if the 
quality of institutions appears to be weak or poor as the case may be. Conversely, a sound 
institutional infrastructure generates less resentments among the competing ethnic groups if 
fairness and equity are allowed to thrive in such a multiethnic setting. 
A reverse situation may equally applyor envisageas indicated by the bi-directional arrows 
moving from institutions to ethnic diversity. The simple interpretationis that institutions may 
as well exacerbate inequality concerns if such institutions are constituted by individuals who 
have stronger empathy toward his/her group only. This sounds plausible as institutions in an 
ethnically diverse society comprising of people who may have come from majority or 
minority group that are being marginalized. The need to recognize and taking account of this 
type of concern underpin the use of an estimator like a system GMM estimator that is 
specifically designed to addressing any simultaneity biases and endogeneity issues that are 
known to characterize the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Linkages between Institutions, Ethnic Diversity and Inequality 
Note: The solid and broken lines indicate direct and indirect effects respectively 
Institutions – rule of law,  
enforcement of property right,  
regulatory quality etc. 
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2.2     Sylized Information on Key Diversity Indices and Measures of Inequality 
Table 1 presents the ethnic fractionalization index (Ethnic) for the most and least diverse 
countries within the sub-Saharan Africa region. Apart from this, it also details the 
decomposition of the ethnic fractionalization index into linguistic and religious components, 
respectively. From the table, Uganda appears to be the most ethnically fragmented country 
with an Ethnic index of 0.93 while Liberia and Madagascar occupy second and third 
positions with 0.91 and 0.88 respectively. In Uganda alone, there are eight different groups: 
Ganda (17.80 percent), Teso (8.90 percent), Nkole (8.20 percent), Soga (8.20 percent), Gisu 
(7.20 percent), Chiga (6.80 percent), Lango (6.00 percent) and Rwanda (5.80 percent). It is 
worth mentioning that over 70% of countries within SSA region are ethnically diverse. The 
least ethnically diverse country is Comoros with ethnic fractionalization index of 0.000, 
suggesting that the country is highly homogeneous. Thus, in Comoros, Comorian takes 100 
percent. With respect to linguistic diversity, Uganda also takes a lead with 0.92 and the last 
goes to Comoros as well.  The most diverse in terms of religion is South Africa with a 0.86 
while the last is claimed by Somalia with 0.002. The most prominent religion in South Africa 
is Christianity with 27.97 percent, directly followed by Protestant (13.79percent), Black 
Independent Church (9.35 percent), other protestant (8.84 percent) and other black 
independent (7.29 percent) in that order. In Somalia, Sunni Muslim alone takes almost 100 
percent of the religious landscape, thus contrasting sharply with that of South Africa with 
over thirty religious sects. 
Table 1: Ethnic Diversity and Components in SSA Countries 
 Countries Ethnic  Linguistic  Religious 
1. Angola 0.79 0.79 0.63 
2. Benin 0.79 0.79 0.55 
3 Botswana 0.41 0.41 0.60 
4. Burkina Faso 0.74 0.72 0.58 
5. Burundi 0.30 0.30 0.52 
6. Cameroun 0.86 0.89 0.73 
7. Cape Verde 0.42 - 0.08 
8. Central Africa Republic 0.83 0.83 0.79 
9. Chad 0.86 0.86 0.64 
10. Comoros 0.00 0.01 0.01 
11. Congo 0.87 0.69 0.66 
12. Cote d’Ivoire 0.82 0.78 0.76 
13. Democratic Republic of Congo 0.87 0.87 0.70 
14. Equatorial Guinea 0.35 0.32 0.12 
15. Eritrea 0.65 0.65 0.43 
16 Ethiopia 0.72 0.81 0.62 
17. Gabon 0.77 0.78 0.67 
18. Gambia 0.78 0.81 0.10 
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19. Ghana 0.67 0.67 0.80 
20. Guinea 0.74 0.77 0.26 
21. Guinea Bisau 0.81 0.81 0.61 
22. Kenya 0.86 0.89 0.78 
23. Lesotho 0.26 0.25 0.72 
24. Liberia 0.91 0.90 0.49 
25. Madagascar 0.88 0.02 0.52 
26. Malawi 0.67 0.60 0.82 
27. Mali 0.69 0.84 0.18 
28. Mozambique 0.69 0.81 0.68 
29. Namibia 0.63 0.70 0.66 
30. Niger 0.65 0.65 0.20 
31. Nigeria 0.85 0.85 0.74 
32. Rwanda 0.32 - 0.51 
33. Sao Tome and Principe - 0.23 0.19 
34. Senegal 0.69 0.70 0.15 
35. Seychelles 0.20 0.16 0.23 
36. Sierra Leone 0.82 0.76 0.54 
37. Somalia 0.81 0.03 0.002 
38. South Africa 0.75 0.87 0.86 
39. Swaziland 0.06 0.17 0.44 
40. Togo 0.71 0.90 0.66 
41. Uganda 0.93 0.92 0.63 
42. Tanzania 0.74 0.90 0.63 
43. Zambia 0.78 0.87 0.74 
44. Zimbabwe 0.39 0.45 0.74 
Source:EncyclopediaBritannica 
 
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the average Gini coefficients for SSA countries. From the 
diagram, it can be seen that income inequality appears to be higher among the Southern 
Africa countries like South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. We also provide the scatter plots 
of income inequality for the four regions of SSA countries in Figure 2a-d (see Appendix). 
The lowest seems to go to countries like Ethiopia, Burundi, Mauritania and Tanzania. Apart 
from the Figure 2 above, the scatter plots of income inequality (y-axis) on interaction of 
ethnic diversity (linguistic, religious and ethnic) and institutions variables (x-axis) are 
presented in Figures 3(a) to 3(c). The visual evidence of the nature of their relationships 
revealed a positive association between inequality and the interactive terms. It implies that 
institution settings in the region do not possibly mediate the adverse effect of ethnic diversity 
on income equality. From the scatter plot in Figure 3(d), a direct relation is also reported 
between institution and income inequality. From the scatter diagrams, the parameter 
estimates using the simple linear regression of religious diversity, linguistic diversity, ethnic 
diversity and institutional quality are 0.0597, 0.0714, 0.0784 and 0.0703 respectively when 
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the regressand is inequality5. These are just preliminary analysis subject to confirmation in 
Section 5 after adding other factor determinants of inequality. The outcomes can be further 
supported in the words of Easterly which reads as follows: “Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
in the cross-country sample adversely affects income, growth, and economic policies, which 
is one explanation for Africa’s poor growth performance” Easterly (2001, p. 690). The 
foregoing,however, represents preliminary analysis which is subject to further empirical 
scrutiny in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
Source:  Graphed with underlying data from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2016). 
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 All the parameter estimates are significant at 5% level but their explanatory powers are low. 
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Figure 3(a-d): Scatter plots of Inequality and Ethnic Diversity and Components and Institution 
 
3.0 Literature Review 
This section undertakes a brief survey of the previously conducted empirical studies on ethnic 
diversity and inequality across different regions so as to provide compelling context for 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
3.1 A Brief Empirical Exposition 
Undeniably, a large body of empirical research has probed into causal linkages between 
ethnic diversity and its associated inequalities within the space of socio-economic and 
political spheres of an economy.Prior to documenting some of these empirical counts with 
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respect to ethnic divert-inequality relations, attempt will be made to x-ray the groundwork for 
the theoretical arguments into the issue. Gary Becker (1957) was one of the pioneer 
researchers who laid out the argument concerning ethnic diversity and inequality around 
racial prejudice and discrimination. According to him, if a person has a “taste for 
discrimination” he must act as if he were willing to forfeit income in order to be associated 
with some persons or groups instead of others. As a means of validating Becker’s analysis, a 
substantial body of empirical research has trailed the theoretical conjectures of racial 
prejudice in a wide variety of contexts.Such studies like Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), and Luttmer (2001) have lent credence to the arguments. Using a 
model of group participation, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)found that the members of non-
majority group derive positive utility from interacting with the members of the same group 
and negative utility from interactions with members of the majority group. A similar 
conclusion was reached by the same authors when they submitted that the level of trust 
seemed higher in racially homogeneous communities (see, Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). 
We commerce an overview of the empirical literature with Dincer and Lambert (2006) who 
set out to analyze both the direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on 
income inequality and on welfare programs across US states using a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) method.They employed two measures of ethnic diversity,namely the 
polarization index (PI) and the fractionalization index (FI) and they assessed the relationship 
between ethnic diversity and income inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient. For PI, 
they are able to establish a positive and linear relationship between ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity and Gini coefficient on the one hand, with a negative and linear relationship 
between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and AFDC/TANF6 payments on the other hand. 
The results appear to chart a different path with the use of fractionalization index. With FI, an 
inverse-U shaped relationship is obtained between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the 
Gini coefficient and a U-shaped relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and 
AFDC/TANF payments. Statistically speaking, the ethnicand religious polarization index 
explained about 37% of the variation in the Gini coefficient across states in the US (increases 
to about 75% when control variables are well accounted for) and close to 10% in 
AFDC/TANF (up to 65% when other explanatory variables are included). Similarly, FI 
explains almost 40% of the variation in Gini coefficients (about 80% with the inclusion of 
other control variables) and almost 20% in AFDC/TANF payments (rises to about 65% when 
                                                          
6
 Refers to Aid to the Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. 
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other conditioning variables are taken into consideration). The outcomes of the follow up 
research by Dincer and Hotard (2011) do not significantly differ from the above reported 
results. In their study, they explore the relationship between ethnic and religious diversity and 
income inequality spanning over a 10-year period for 58 countries. In the final analysis, they 
discovered a positive relationship between ethnic and religious polarization and income 
inequality and an inverse U-shaped relationship between ethnic and religious fractionalization 
and income inequality. They also established that transiting from homogeneous position (that 
is, polarization index of zero) with respect to ethnic (religion) to heterogeneous stance 
(polarization index of one) would increase the Gini coefficient by almost 6 for ethnic and 3 
percentage points for religious fractionalization respectively. Using a pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS), Hotard (2008) tested the relationship between income inequality and ethnic 
heterogeneity on a panel of 58 countries.His results showed that ethnic polarization exerts a 
positive and significant effect on income inequality, even after controlling for country 
characteristics and regional differences. Similar in spirit with the present inquiry were studies 
by Easterly (2001) and Madni (2018). Easterly (2001) was able to establish that ethnic 
diversity exerts a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are 
poor. Conversely, in countries with sufficiently good institutions, ethnic diversity does not 
seem to lower growth or worsen economic policies. More recently was a study by Madni 
(2018) that probed into institutional quality through ethnic diversity, income inequality and 
public spending for Pakistan over the period, 1984-2015. Using ARDL approach, he found 
out that ethnic diversity and income inequality caused deterioration to institutional structures 
of the country at one end, while public spendingimproved the quality on the other end. 
In light of the brief expositions, it is apparent that the particular literature that crafts a role for 
institutions in ethnic diversity-inequality relation is still at its infancy. It is in recognition of 
this fact that the present study draws its strength. 
 
4.0 Methodolgy, Empirical Modelling and Data 
4.1 Methodology 
The paper employs a panel data analysis since it allows for the control of variables that are 
unobservable as well as immensurable. Basically, the panel OLS, fixed effects (FE) and 
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation methods are adopted in this study. 
The panel OLS combines the subscript of time series (t) and cross-sectional unit (i) to 
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accommodate the properties of both time series and cross-section data. This is summarily 
given as: 
tititi Xy ,
'
,,
   ;,...,1 Ni  Tt ,...,1        (1) 
The cross-section dimension such as country is represented by i subscript and the time series 
dimension denoted by t subscript. More so,   is a scalar;   is a row vector 1K ; '
,tiX  is the 
ith observation on K explanatory variables; ti ,  is the stochastic term. The one-way error 
component panel fixed effect split the error term )(
,ti  into two components as: 
tititi vu ,,,   ;,...,1 Ni  Tt ,...,1         (2) 
where itu is the unobservable individual specific effect accounting for any individual-specific 
effect that is not included in the regression; and ti ,  is idiosyncratic disturbance varying with 
individuals and time (Baltagi, 2008). Using the fixed effects method, ti ,  denotes fixed 
parameters that is estimated; ti ,  is independent and identically distributed [IID( 2,0 v )] (the 
normality and heteroskedasticity assumption); and '
,tiX isassumed to be independent of tiv , for 
all country (i) and time (t) (endogeneity assumption). In addition, we assume the unobserved 
effects vary between countries (i.e. heterogeneous) rather than a random term that 
assumesusage ofthe random effects technique. We further used the cross section weights (a 
feasible Generalized Least Squares (GLS) specification assuming the presence of cross-
section heteroskedasticity) to correct for cross-section heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of idiosyncratic disturbance. The reason for employing the cross section weights is to ensure 
that the fixed estimator is efficient and consistent for our analyses as used by earlier studies 
such as Hammoris and Kai (2004); Guordon, Maystre and Melo (2006); and Heinrich (2009). 
The Hausman test resultisalso computed to confirm the efficiency of the fixed effects 
estimator. 
We further applied the system GMM method to establish the relationship among our 
variables based on five motivational reasons in its use as documented in Asongu and De 
Moor (2017). Thesereasons are: (a) The estimation process is a good fit for addressing the 
issue of high persistence in the dependent variable. The result of correlation coefficient of 
income inequality and its lagged of one value is 0.956 which supersedes the value of the rule 
of thumb threshold (0.800) (Tchamyou, 2019a). (b) The process is good for a study that has 
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lower number of years per country (T) than the number of countries (N), thus, our T(20) < 
N(26). (c) It is capable of controlling for potential endogeneity in all regressors. (d) The 
approach does not eliminate cross-country variation (e) Based on the fourth merit, Bond, 
Hoeffler and Tample (2001) suggested the system GMM estimator by Arellano and 
Bover(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) as a better fit compared to the difference 
estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). The requirements for adopting the approach is based 
on the first-two reasons (Tchamyou &  Asongu, 2017) while the last three stressed the 
associated merits for its adoption (Tchamyou, 2019b). 
The study used the forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences adopted by 
Roodman (2009a,b) which is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995). According to Love 
andZicchino (2006) and Baltagi (2008), the estimation method can control for cross-country 
dependence and check over identification and control the proliferation of instruments. The 
two-step approach is employed in the specification since it controls for heteroskedasticity as 
against the one-step that is consistent with homoskedasticity. Equations (3) and (4) in levels 
and first difference respectively summarize the standard system GMM estimation process in 
line with our baseline model (Equation 1). 
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Where: Inequal stands for inequality; EthnDiv represents ethnic diversity; EthnDiv*Inst is the 
interaction between ethnic diversity and institution; Inst equals institution and Controlvar 
proxies a set of control variables. h ,, 410  are parameter estimates; represents tau; i is the 
country-specific effect, t is the time specific constant; and ti , is the stochastic term. The 
difference equation is derived from the level equation and tau is defined as the autoregressive 
order, which is one in the analysis because one period can comprehensively capture past 
exogenous information. It is also imperative to discuss briefly some drawbacks identified by 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) following the use of interactive regressions. The authors 
further note that in the model specifications, all constitutive variables should be absorbed. 
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The estimated coefficients should be interpreted as conditional marginal impacts for them to 
make economic sense (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
We further conducted some post-estimation diagnostic tests to establish the consistency of the 
system GMM coefficients. The presence of second-order serial correlation is confirmed based 
on the value of AR (2) which denotes the absence of autocorrelation in the error terms should 
not be rejected. If the probability value is not rejected, therefore, the problem of second-order 
autocorrelation exists.Furthermore, the null hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restriction test should not also be rejected, implying that the instruments are 
valid that is that are not correlated with the error terms. Summary, the Sargan (Hansen) over-
identification restriction tests implies not robust but not weakened by instruments (is robust 
but weakened by instruments). We address this conflict by prioritizing the Hansen test and 
ensuring that the number of instruments in each specification is less than the corresponding 
number of countries in order to avoid instrument proliferation.The jointly validity of our 
estimated parameters was confirmed from the statistical value of  Fisher test. 
 
4.2 Empirical Modeling 
The empirical model for estimating the causal linkage between ethnic diversity and inequality 
together with interaction terms duly aligns with other previously conducted studieson 
modulating policy syndromes with policy variables to achieve favorable macroeconomic 
outcomes (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016b, 2017b; Asongu et al., 2017). The model 
specification is stated as follows: 
titititititi ControlInstEthnDivInstEthnDivInequal ,,4,3,2,10, var)(    (5) 
In a more explicit form, the above equation (1) can be rewritten as thus: 
tititititititi
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 (6) 
where Inequal represents a surrogate forinequalityis captured bythe Gini coefficient, EthnDiv 
stands for the measures of ethnic diversity which in this case are two,namely language and 
religious diversity,Inst denotes institutional index and the variable comprises of six indices, 
which are Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability,Rule of Law, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Political Stability. Thisis one of the most carefully 
constructed indicators. The indices ranged from –2.5 (beingthe weakest) to 2.5 (being the 
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strongest), while the percentile ranking ranged from 0(weakest) to 100(strongest). i  is 
country, t  is time and  is the error or disturbance term with expected mean zero and 
constant variance. In addition, the error term isboth identically and independently distributed. 
EthnicDiv×Inst constitutes the interactive term between ethnic diversity and institution and 
Controlvar is an omnibus variable for a set of control variables capable of influencing 
inequality. These are carefully selected variables in the inequality literature(see 
Asongu&Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018). The variables include gross domestic 
product per capita (GDPPC), literacy rates (LITR), globalization (GLOB), urbanization rates 
(URB), financial development (FDEV), inflation (INF), labour force participation rates (LFC) 
and political regime types (POLITY_IV) respectively. 
In terms of a priori expectations, irrespective of ethnic diversity measures (whether linguistic 
or religious as the case may be) used, a positive relationship is hypothesized between ethnic 
diversity and inequality. By implication, the higher the ethnic diversity, the higher the 
incidence of inequality. Many studies (e.g. like Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Dincer & Lambert, 
2006; Dincer & Hotard, 2011) have offered empirical support to this. A reverse outcome is 
expected between institutions and inequality. That is, an inverse relationship is posited in the 
sense that a sound institutional framework is expected to mitigate the impacts of inequality. 
Conversely, a bad institutional infrastructure may help deepen the effects of inequality on the 
economy. The interactive term is also expected to be inversely correlated with a measure of 
inequality. Thus, an ethnically fractionalized country that is being adorned with sound 
institutions would help minimize the effects of inequality and vice versa. This explains why a 
developed country like the US has a comparatively high level of income inequality, though 
having a high racial and religious heterogeneous society. 
Apart from the core variables of interest, the control variables also have some theoretical 
relationships with inequality. For instance, the relationship between per capita GDP and 
income inequality is conjectured to be ambiguous according to the Simon Kuznets hypothesis. 
This is confirmed to be true given the level and stage of development of the country 
concerned. According to Kuznets, a country’s level of income inequality is affected by the 
state of economic development. That is, as an economy develops, market forces first increase 
then decrease the overall economic inequality. Hence, the existence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. In terms of educational 
variables, literacy rates arealso assumed to have a negative causal relationship with ethnic 
diversity. This can be explained to mean that increased literacy rates tend to narrow down the 
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extent of ethnic diversity. A reduced level of literacy might end up widening inequality.The 
effect of globalization forces on inequality can be said to be ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
level of integration of a country can help lift people of that country from poverty due to 
exposure to state-of-the-art technology, thus reducing inequality; it can also be argued, on the 
other hand, that globalization may end up enriching the few privileged individuals thereby 
widening the gap between them and the poor. The degree of urbanization is hypothesized to 
bear a negative relationship with inequality. The higher the urbanization rate, the lower the 
level of inequality. The more a country’s financial system deepens, the better the financial 
services become, with the overall consequence being reduction in inequality. Thus, a negative 
causal relationship is envisaged.Macroeconomic stability (surrogated by inflation rates) 
equally goes along way in determining the level of inequality in an economy. Inequality 
worsens in an environment that ismacroeconomically unstable. In this case, a positive 
relationship is posited. The variable of labour force participation is expected to have a 
negative correlation with inequality. Hence, the higher the labour force participation rates, the 
lower the inequality level and vice versa. Lastly, the type of political regime is another 
determinant of inequality in the empirical literature. If a democratic system of governance 
prevails,reduced inequality is expected to manifest, while a reverse condition will be 
envisaged in case of an autocratic governance type. Hence, the use of polity IV (that is the 
difference between the two regimes) and the coefficient is assumed to be negative under an 
autocratic system while it becomes positive for a democratic rule. 
4.3 Data Source 
The data spanning from 1996 to 2015 were obtained from the following sources: Easterly and 
Levine (1997), The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) core dataset 2015, World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) CD-ROM and World Development Indicators (WDI). The 26 Sub-Saharan 
African countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The sources of our data as well as their definitions 
are presented in Table 2. The choice of the periodicity and sampled countries is motivated by 
data availability constraints. Moreover, data on institutions from WGI is only available from 
1996. 
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Table 2: Variables’ Definitions 
Variables Signs Variable measurements Sources 
Income inequality INEQUAL Gini Coefficient measure the disparity of income earn by 
residents in a country. Easterly and Levine, 1997  
Linguistic diversity LIN It measures differences in language among groups in a country 
ranging from 0 to 1. Encyclopedia Britannica 
Religious diversity REL It measures differences in religious activities among people of a 
country ranging from 0 to 1. Encyclopedia Britannica 
Ethnic diversity ETHN It measures differences in ethnical values and beliefs among groups in a country ranging from 0 to 1. Encyclopedia Britannica 
Institution INST 
It comprises of six institutional components, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and political stability. It ranges 
from –2.5 (beingthe weakest) to 2.5 (being the strongest). 
World governance Indicators (2016) 
GDP per capita GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per capital (Constant 2010 US$) World Development Indicators (2016) 
GDPPC square root  GDPPC_SQD Square values of Gross Domestic Product per capital (Constant 2010 US$) World Development Indicators (2016) 
Literacy (adult total)  LITR The percentage of literate people within the ages 15 and above. World Development Indicators (2016) 
Globalization rate GLOB 
This measures the rate of globalization in countries around the 
world which is measured in three dimensions, economic, social 
and political. 
Dreher, Gatsonand Martens (2008) 
Urban population growth URB The annual growth of people living in urban area. World Development Indicators (2016) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector FDEV The ratio of domestic credit to private sector by bank to GDP. World Development Indicators (2016) 
Inflation rate INF The annual rate of consumer price index World Development Indicators (2016) 
Labour force, total LFC The percentage of total population within ages 15+ (national 
estimate) who are eligible to work in a country. World Development Indicators (2016) 
Democratic rule PRTY_1 The political regime of democratic rules ranging from 0 to +10 Polity IV (2015) 
Autocratic rule PRTY_2 The political regime of autocratic rules which ranges between -1 to -10 Polity IV (2015) 
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5.0 Empirical Result and Discussion 
5.1 Analysis ofPreliminary Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the panel datasets is presented in Table 3. The mean value of 
income inequality is 0.4534. The average values of linguistic, religion and ethnic diversities 
are 0.673, 0.568 and 0.687 respectively. This indicates high heterogeneous nature of religion, 
linguistic and ethnicity in the region. The negative mean values of institutional index of -
0.5367 further accentuates the level of the region’s infrastructure decadence. The average 
value of domestic credit to the private sector by financial institutions to the size of the SSA 
economy stand at 19.0%. The democratic system of governance has the highest mean value 
of 3.725 compared to the average value of the autocratic rule which is 1.383 making the mean 
value of polity IV index to be 2.3423. By implication this is suggestive that most of the 
countries in the region have embraced democracy as their system of governance. The region 
also has an average labour force size and literacy level of 65.23% and 54.74% respectively, 
representing those that are within the age bracket of 15 years and above, while the urban 
population grows at an annual rate of 3.98%. The average value of GDP per capita of the 
region is US$1,277 indicating that the region falls within the lower middle-income 
economies according to the recent classification of the World Bank Atlas method. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Income inequality 0.4534 0.6576 0.2981 0.0860 
Linguistic diversity 0.6732 0.9226 0.0204 0.2529 
Religion diversity 0.5682 0.8603 0.0149 0.2383 
Ethnic diversity 0.6867 0.9302 0.0582 0.2054 
Institution -0.5357 0.8677 -1.7500 0.4864 
GDP per capita 1277 7611 187 1605 
GDP per capita (ln) 6.7007 8.9373 5.2307 0.8598 
GDPPC square root (ln)  45.637 79.876 27.360 12.189 
Literacy (adult total) 54.738 94.598 12.848 20.846 
Globalization rate (ln) 3.7230 4.1784 3.0559 0.2094 
Urban population growth 3.9794 6.7261 -0.0466 1.1988 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks 19.003 160.13 0.4104 24.625 
Inflation rate 7.7397 50.734 -9.6162 8.1734 
Labour force, total 65.226 92.700 6.1700 16.852 
Democratic rule (A) 3.7250 9.0000 -8.0000 3.9221 
Autocratic rule (B) 1.3837 9.0000 -8.0000 3.0754 
Political regime types (A–B) 2.3423 9.0000 -9.0000 5.0860 
                                                          
7
 The high value of this variable could have been due to perception-based nature of the institutional variables 
obtained from World Governance Indicators database. 
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Number of observation is 520. STD. DEV. is standard deviation. 
 
The correlation coefficients of the relationship between the measures of ethnic diversities 
(linguistic, religion and ethnic), institutions, other covariates and income inequality are 
presented in Table 4. Themeasures of linguistic and ethnic diversities are found to be 
negatively correlated with income inequality while religious diversity has a contrary sign. Of 
the diversity measures, religion has the highest correlation coefficient followed by ethnic 
diversity and linguistic diversity. From the table, institutional variableappears to be 
moderately and positively correlated with income inequality. The results are in tandem with 
the directions of the scatter plots presented in Figures 2(a-d). All other variables convey 
positive correlation coefficients with the exception of urban population growth and labour 
force. Literacy rate is negatively correlated with linguistic diversity while urban population 
growth is indirectly correlated with religion diversity. Conversely, literacy rate, GDP per 
capita and its squared value are very much correlated with ethnic diversity. The interactive 
terms of institution and the diversity measures are inversely correlated with ethnic, religion 
and language diversities. Thus, other correlation coefficients of the indicators are further 
reported in the table at varying degrees and magnitudes. 
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Table 4: Correlation between Ethnic Diversity, income inequality and its determinants 
 
INEQUAL LAN REL ETHN INST LAN×INST REL×INST ETHN×INST GDPPC GDPPC_SQD LITR GLOB URB FDEV INF LFC 
LAN -0.1002 1 
              
REL 0.3408 0.2577 1 
             
ETHN -0.2407 0.6770 0.1740 1 
            
INST 0.3979 -0.1500 -0.0307 -0.1914 1 
           
LAN_INST 0.3073 -0.4895 -0.1658 -0.4438 0.8804 1 
          
REL_INST 0.2415 -0.2580 -0.3465 -0.2824 0.9199 0.9067 1 
         
ETHN_INST 0.3284 -0.3682 -0.1371 -0.5034 0.8993 0.9645 0.9076 1 
        
GDPPC 0.5296 -0.0773 0.1718 -0.2425 0.5292 0.4264 0.4333 0.4453 1 
       
GDPPC_SQD 0.5452 -0.0919 0.1795 -0.2650 0.5370 0.4440 0.4442 0.4637 0.9969 1 
      
LITR 0.4457 -0.2999 0.4572 -0.3123 0.2751 0.3291 0.1367 0.3152 0.5283 0.5357 1 
     
GLOB 0.2926 0.1245 0.0573 -0.0024 0.4749 0.3505 0.4212 0.3592 0.6928 0. 6767 0.3196 1 
    
URB -0.5205 0.1774 -0.2101 0.3311 -0.2034 -0.1834 -0.1113 -0.2073 -0.5487 -0.5588 0.3833 -0.2835 1 
   
FDEV 0.3457 0.1070 0.1867 0.0080 0.3831 0.3914 0.3740 0.3876 0.5555 0.5888 0.3414 0.4676 -0.2787 1 
  
INF 0.0771 -0.0544 0.2784 -0.0428 -0.0108 0.0182 -0.0784 0.0232 -0.0493 -0.0458 0.2131 0.0100 -0.0204 -0.0724 1 
 
LFC -0.1839 0.0843 0.2452 0.1790 -0.1006 -0.0480 -0.1714 -0.0613 -0.4189 -0.4110 -0.1005 -0.2263 0.3348 -0.0959 0.0847 1 
POLITY_IV 0.1786 0.0258 0.2614 0.0965 0.4037 0.3244 0.2910 0.3040 0.1065 0.1180 0.1097 0.1837 0.0017 0.2684 0.0691 0.1261 
Notes: INEQUAL is income inequality, LAN is linguistic diversity, REL is religious diversity, ETHN is ethnic diversity, INST is institutional quality,LAN×INST is 
interaction between linguistic diversity and institutional quality, REL×INST is the interaction between religious diversity and institutional quality, ETHN×INST is the 
interaction between ethnic diversity and institutional quality, GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita, GDPPC_SQD is gross domestic product per capita squared, LITR 
is literacy rates, GLOB is globalization, URB is urbanization rates, FDEV is financial development, INF is inflation rate, LFC is labour force participation rates and 
POLITY_IV is political regime types. 
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5.2 Empirical Estimates of the Panel Regression Models 
The discussion of empirical results for income inequality is presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
5.2.1 Baseline Pooled and Fixed Effects Regressions8 
Table 5 reports the results of pooled OLS and panel fixed effects which controls for 
unobserved country characteristics. The Hausman test statistics presented in the table reveal 
the appropriateness of the panel fixed effects as the results reject the null hypotheses for all 
the considered models at 5% significance levels based on the calculated Chi-Square 
values.The models are first estimated without the interactive terms of institutions and ethnic 
diversity composition, and these are shown in the first six columns. The last six columns 
present the estimated regression results with the interactive terms of the key variables of 
interest. The results of our coefficients are not consistent in terms of signs with respect to the 
two baseline estimators, namely OLS and fixed effects. The findings from the pooled OLS 
established that: (a) linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity increase the level of inequality in 
the region and (b) the interaction terms of institutional quality and linguistic, religious and 
ethnic diversity reduce inequality, while institutions still maintain a direct relationship with 
inequality. From panel fixed effects, the results reveal that (a) an inverse relationships exist 
between linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity and income inequality and (b) the impact of 
the interactive terms of institutional quality, together with linguistic, religious and ethnic 
diversity respectively on inequality are insignificant at their conventional levels. A system 
GMM is equally deployed to increase the bite on endogeneity, notably by: (a) controlling for 
time invariant omitted variables in order to further account for the unobserved heterogeneity 
and cross sectional dependence and (b) accounting for simultaneity or reverse causation by 
means of the instrumentation process. This is discussed in what follows. 
  
                                                          
8
 Much efforts are not expended expantiating on these baseline regression results because of their inherent 
econometrical problems. Hence, justify our spending more time and space explaining in details the results of the 
system GMM. 
25 
 
Table 5: Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Income Inequality 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effecta Pooled OLS Fixed Effecta 
Linguistic  Religion Ethnic Linguistic  Religion Ethnic Linguistic  Religion Ethnic Linguistic  Religion Ethnic 
Constant 1.1362 (0.177)*** 
1.0438 
(0.167)*** 
1.0913 
(0.186)*** 
1.4461 
(0.513)*** 
1.245 
(0.434)*** 
1.4744 
(0.624)*** 
1.1350 
(0.174)*** 
1.1887 
(0.172)*** 
0.9783 
(0.179)*** 
1.4512 
(0.511)*** 
1.2445 
(0.434)*** 
1.4707 
(0.531)*** 
LAN 0.0372 (0.013)***   
-0.02148 
(0.008)***   
-0.0411 
(0.0230)*   
-0.0216 
(0.076)***   
REL  0.085 (0.016)***   
-0.0219 
(0.008)***   
0.0195 
(0.0258)   
-0.0219 
(0.0076)***  
ETHN   0.0216 (0.0175)   
-0.02146 
(0.008)***   
-0.1650 
(0.0032)***   
-0.2141 
(0.0774)*** 
INST 0.0323 (0.0079)*** 
0.042 
(0.008)*** 
0.0294 
(0.008)*** 
-0.0157 
(0.0140) 
-0.0159 
(0.014) 
-0.0157 
(0.0140) 
0.1130 
(0.021)*** 
0.1230 
(0.027)*** 
0.1938 
(0.0255)*** 
-0.0412 
(0.0300) 
-0.0145 
(0.0272) 
-0.0181 
(0.055) 
LAN×INST       -0.1275 (0.031)***   
0.0426 
(0.044)   
REL×INST        -0.1289 (0.040)***   
-0.0281 
(0.0468)  
ETHN×INST         -0.2520 (0.0372)***   
0.0033 
(0.0754) 
lnGDPPC -0.1721 (0.057)*** 
-0.0154 
(0.054)*** 
-0.1635 
(0.061)*** 
-0.0943 
(0.1018) 
-0.00997 
(0.1038) 
-0.0094 
(0.1038) 
-0.1623 
(0.056)*** 
-0.1867 
(0.055)*** 
-0.0815 
(0.049)* 
-0.0091 
(0.104) 
-0.01001 
(0.1039) 
-0.0098 
(0.1043) 
lnGDPPC_SQD 0.0142 (0.0041)*** 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
0.0137 
(0.004)*** 
0.0034 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.00034 
(0.0080) 
0.0130 
(0.004)*** 
0.0146 
(0.004)*** 
0.0064 
(0.0043) 
0.000077 
(0.008) 
0.00044 
(0.008) 
0.00035 
(0.0080) 
LITR 0.00077 (0.0002)*** 
0.00027 
(0.0002) 
0.00066 
(0.0002)*** 
-0.00019 
(0.00031) 
-0.00018 
(0.00031) 
-0.00019 
(0.0003) 
0.00074 
(0.0002)*** 
0.00035 
(0.0002)** 
0.00065 
(0.0002)*** 
-0.000096 
(0.00033) 
-0.00019 
(0.00032) 
-0.00018 
(0.00032) 
LNGLOB -0.0395 (0.0215)* 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.0330 
(0.0214) 
-0.0551 
(0.028)** 
-0.0541 
(0.0282)* 
-0.0551 
(0.0282)** 
-0.0329 
(0.0212) 
-0.0174 
(0.0208) 
-0.0399 
(0.021)** 
-0.0575 
(0.028)** 
-0.0540 
(0.0282)* 
-0.0551 
(0.0282)** 
URB -0.0217 (0.003)*** 
-0.0189 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0217 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0135 
(0.004)*** 
-0.0135 
(0.0041)*** 
-0.0135 
(0.004)*** 
-0.0205 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0178 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0186 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0133 
(0.004)*** 
-0.0135 
(0.0042)*** 
-0.0135 
(0.0042)*** 
FDEV -0.000295 (0.00019) 
-0.00019 
(0.00018) 
-0.00023 
(0.00002) 
0.0018(0.00
05)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0005)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0005)*** 
0.00015 
(0.0002) 
-0.000012 
(0.00018) 
0.00064 
(0.00023)*** 
0.0019 
(0.0005)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0005)*** 
0.0018 
(0.00046)*** 
INF 0.00038 (0.00037) 
0.000012 
(0.0004) 
0.00042 
(0.00037) 
-0.00018 
(0.00029) 
-0.00019 
(0.00028) 
-0.00018 
(0.00029) 
0.00049 
(0.00036) 
0.00015 
(0.00037) 
0.00071 
(0.00036)** 
-0.00016 
(0.00029) 
-0.00019 
(0.0003) 
-0.00018 
(0.00029) 
LFC 0.000066 -0.00029 0.000089 -0.00012 - - 0.00016(0. -0.000033 0.00028(0. -0.00012 - -
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(0.000197) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00022) 0.00011(0.
00022) 
0.00012(
0.00022) 
0002) (0.0002)* 00019) (0.00022) 0.00011(0.
00022) 
0.00012(0.
00022) 
POLITY_IV 0.00107 (0.00064)* 
0.000007 
(0.00066) 
0.0011 
(0.00065)* 
-0.00011 
(0.00085) 
0.0011 
(0.00085) 
0.0011 
(0.00085) 
0.00059 
(0.00064) 
-0.000066 
(0.000656) 
0.00026 
(0.00064) 
0.0012 
(0.00086) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
0.000112 
(0.00086) 
Net Effects - - - - - - 0.0272 0.0886 -0.0300 n.a n.a n.a 
Adj. R2 0.433 0.456 0.426 0.121b 0.121b 0.1208b 0.463 0.466 0.473 0.122b 0.121b 0.1209b 
F-Statistics 37.08*** 40.56*** 36.05*** 29.99*** 28.01*** 30.61*** 36.48*** 38.71*** 39.78*** 28.42*** 27.02*** 26.41*** 
Hansen Test - - - 7.38*** 7.42*** 7.37*** - - - 7.40*** 7.43*** 7.14*** 
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Obs. 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Notes:Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses; *, ** & *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.INEQUAL is income 
inequality, LAN is linguistic diversity, REL is religious diversity, ETHN is ethnic diversity, INST is institutional quality, LAN×INST is interaction between linguistic 
diversity and institutional quality, REL×INST is the interaction between religious diversity and institutional quality, ETHN×INST is the interaction between ethnic diversity 
and institutional quality, GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita, GDPPC_SQD is gross domestic product per capita squared, LITR is literacy rates, GLOB is 
globalization, URB is urbanization rates, FDEV is financial development, INF is inflation rate, LFC is labour force participation rates and POLITY_IV is political regime 
types. (a)- one-way fixed effect (b)- adjusted R2 (within). The significance of estimated parameters,F-statistics and Hausman test. na implies not applicable due to the 
insignificance of marginal effects. 
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5.2.2 Empirical Discussion of the System GMM Results 
Table 6 presents the results of the linkages between ethnolinguistic and religion diversities, 
institutions and inequality. From the table, it can be seen that different forms of diversity play 
contributory roles in worsening income inequality in the region. Statistically speaking, a one 
standard deviation increase in language, religion and ethnic diversities increases income 
inequality by 0.0045, 0.00637 and 0.0115 respectively. This further accentuates the damaging 
impacts of ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization on income inequality. The 
magnitude of statistical impacts is weighty for religion diversity judging by 5% conventional 
level. That is, the impact of religious diversity on inequality appears to be more acute as 
compared to others. Thus, the result has lent credence to the fact that ethnolinguistic and 
religious diversity had severeimplications for causing income inequality in the region.This is 
plausibly logical as people who speak the same language, belong to the same ethnic and 
religion sects tend to discriminate against those who do not belong to them both in terms of 
employment allocation and job placements. It is startling also to note that interacting each of 
the diversity measures does not change the status quo either. For instance, with the inclusion 
of interaction terms in columns 4, 5 and 6, we equally observe that a one standard 
deviationincrease in language, religion and ethnic diversity increases income disparity by 
0.0027, 0.0087 and 0.058 respectively. This simply confirms the level of institutional 
decadence confronting the region.The results further reveal that the effects of ethnolinguistic 
and religion fractionalization refuse to disappear even when interactive terms ofthe variables 
with institutions are controlled for.The coefficients on religious and ethnic diversities indicate 
the severity of inequality generated seemed more damaging than that of language diversity. 
The coefficient on institutional quality indicates that institution is directly related to income 
inequality implying that the institutional framework in this region is not good enough to 
lessen the inequality brought by ethnolingustic and religious diversities. All together, this 
result appears counterintuitive as institutions are expected to play a mitigating role than 
acting contrariwisely. 
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Table 6: Panel System GMM Estimation Regression Results 
Variables Dependent Variable: Income Inequality Linguistic  Religion Ethnic Linguistic  Religion Ethnic 
Constant -0.1098 (0.060)*** 
-0.1201 
(0.055)** 
-0.0904 
(0.0634) 
-0.1046 
(0.050)** 
-0.1250 
(0.052)*** 
-0.0843 
(0.052)* 
INEQUAL(-1) 1.0113 (0.030)*** 
1.0089 
(0.029)*** 
1.0061 
(0.030)*** 
1.0151 
(0.026)*** 
1.0116 
(0.030)*** 
1.0109 
(0.0221) 
LAN 0.00470 (0.0031) 
  0.0045 
(0.0027)* 
  
REL  0.00639 (0.0067) 
  0.00637 
(0.0031)** 
 
ETHN   0.0094 (0.0050)* 
  0.0115 
(0.0126)* 
INST 0.0024 (0.0011)** 
0.0027 
(0.0014)** 
0.0029 
(0.0014)** 
0.0035 
(0.0114) 
0.00201 
(0.0011)* 
-0.0019 
(0.00151) 
LAN×INST    0.0027 (0.0016)* 
  
REL×INST     0.0087 (0.0016)** 
 
ETHN×INST      0.0058 (0.0031)* 
lnGDPPC 0.0289 (0.016)* 
0.0293 
(0.017)* 
0.0230 
(0.0107)** 
0.0259 
(0.0148)* 
0.0298 
(0.0179) 
0.0172 
(0.0103)* 
lnGDPPC_SQD -0.0025 (0.0013)* 
-0.0021 
(0.0013)* 
-0.00173 
(0.00101)* 
-0.0018 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021 
(0.0011)* 
-0.00182 
(0.0011)* 
LITR 0.000019 (0.00007) 
-0.000016 
(0.00006) 
0.000019 
(0.000073) 
0.000023 
(0.000072) 
-0.000016 
(0.00006) 
0.000021 
(0.000076) 
lnGLOB -0.0012 (0.0110) 
0.0033 
(0.0119) 
-0.0011 
(0.0109) 
-0.0013 
(0.0102) 
-0.0032 
(0.0115) 
0.00088 
(0.0106) 
URB -0.0071 (0.0016)*** 
-0.0053 
(0.0016)*** 
-0.0011 
(0.0018) 
-0.0025 
(0.0014)* 
-0.0026 
(0.0015)* 
-0.0069 
(0.0014)*** 
FDEV -0.00034 (0.00053) 
-0.00039 
(0.0005) 
-0.00019 
(0.00066) 
-0.0022 
(0.00086) 
-0.00036 
(0.00061) 
-0.000054 
(0.00093) 
INF -0.00051 (0.00034) 
-0.00056 
(0.00030)* 
-0.00049 
(0.00036) 
-0.00049 
(0.00038) 
-0.00054 
(0.00032)* 
-0.00044 
(0.00038) 
LFC -0.000138 (0.00091) 
0.00011 
(0.0001) 
-0.00013 
(0.000094) 
-0.000141 
(0.00009) 
0.00010 
(0.000095) 
-0.00013 
(0.000093) 
POLITY_IV 0.00015 (0.0002) 
0.00021 
(0.00022) 
0.00019 
(0.0634) 
0.00011 
(0.00022) 
0.00019 
(0.00023) 
0.00014 
(0.00023) 
Net Effects9 - - - 0.00305 0.00171 0.00839 
Fisher 2831.19*** 6776.3*** 3125.91*** 3658.06*** 7343.50*** 4012.65*** 
AR(-1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
AR(-2) (0.208) (0.205) (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) (0.210) 
Sargan OIR (0.790) (0.796) (0.789) (0.800) (0.796) (0.799) 
Hansen OIR (0.101) (0.133) (0.098) (0.098) (0.141) (0.108) 
Instruments 15 15 15 16 16 16 
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Obs. 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Notes:Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses;*, ** & *** indicate 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively.INEQUAL is income inequality, LAN is linguistic diversity, REL is 
religious diversity, ETHN is ethnic diversity, INST is institutional quality, LAN×INST is interaction between 
                                                          
9
 According to Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), pitfalls  are inherently associated with interactive regressions, 
hence there is need to include all constitutive variables in the specifications. Further, the estimated parameters 
will make more economic sense if only interpreted as conditional marginal impacts. 
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linguistic diversity and institutional quality, REL×INST is the interaction between religious diversity and 
institutional quality, ETHN×INST is the interaction between ethnic diversity and institutional quality, GDPPC is 
gross domestic product per capita, GDPPC_SQD is gross domestic product per capita squared, LITR is literacy 
rates, GLOB is globalization, URB is urbanization rates, FDEV is financial development, INF is inflation rate, 
LFC is labour force participation rates and POLITY_IV is political regime types.OIR is Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is in three ways: (a) The probability values of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. (b) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (i) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; (ii) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
For other covariates, to start with, the importance of inequality persistence is well stressed 
across the models except for the last column in Table 6 under ethnic. By implication, the 
previous experience in income disparity remains a formidable driving force for the current 
income inequality episode. In fact, a one standard deviation  increase in linguistic, religion 
and ethnic increases income inequality by well over 100 percent as suggested by their 
coefficients. This broadly reflects in their levels of statistical significance across the models.  
Further, the parameter estimates of GDP per capita reveal a positive and direct connection 
between income levels and inequality in the region. This suggests that wide disparity indeed 
exists between the rich and the poor. It is also important to state that Kuznets hypothesis 
remains valid across the models. The coefficient on urbanization rate has a negative effect on 
income inequality in the region thus authenticating the assertion of the influx of people from 
rural to urban centres. This is not unexpected as there are wide gaps between the rural and 
urban dwellers. It is worth noting that the statistical relevance between urbanization rate and 
income inequality flunctuates are particularly noticeable given the 1% statistical level. 
Financial development, globalization index and labour force participation rate are negatively 
associated to inequality but they are found to be insignificant at their conventional levels. 
This implies that better financial services, high force participation rates and the level of 
countries’ integration into the global world tend to lower inequality level but exerting no 
significant influence. On average, the rate of literacy is unable to narrow inequality gap while 
macroeconomic instability is able to marginally close the gap. Their coefficient values are not 
statistically significant. The parameter estimates of polity IV values depict prevalence of 
democratic system in the region. The levels of statistical insignificance on the coefficients of 
polity IV further authenticates nascent nature of the continent’s democratic dispensation, and 
thus making it difficult reducing the level of income inequality confronting the region. This is 
not surprising as African democratic structures are riddled with corruption and other allied 
corrupt practices 
Our main findings, however, emerge from the bottom part of Table 6 in the row named “Net 
Effects”. This reveals the impact of ethnic diversity on inequality when the model includes 
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the interactive institution terms. The net impact from the various regression models with 
interactive institution variable is calculated as:



 

tiInstEthnInstin
inequalin
,42%
%  . The 
result shows that the elasticity of income inequality obtained from the system GMM 
regression approach are 0.0031, 0.0017 and 0.0084 for linguistic, religious and ethnic 
diversity respectively, when they were evaluated at an average institutional index level of -
0.5357. Correspondingly, the elasticity of inequality becomes 0.0017, -0.0025 and 0.0056 
evaluated at one standard deviation below the mean value of institution (-1.0021) while at 
one standard deviation above the mean value (-0.0493), inequality elasticity turns out to be 
0.0044, 0.0059 and 0.0112. 
 
7.0 Concluding Implication and Future Research Direction 
Studies on the causes of income differences between the rich and the poor have received an 
extensive attention in the inequality empirics. While ethnic diversity has also been identified 
as one of the fundamental causes of income inequality, the role of institutionsas a mediating 
factor in the ethnicity-inequality nexus has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. 
Accordingly, it is of policy relevance to assess how a policy variable (i.e. institutional 
quality) can be employed to modulate the effect of ethnicity on inequality. This study 
complements the existing literature by investigating the extent to which institutional 
framework corrects the noisy influence originating from the nexus between“ethnic diversity” 
and inequality in twenty-six SSA countries for the period 1996-2015.The empirical evidence 
is based on pooled OLS, fixed effects and system GMM estimation techniques.  
The study discovered that the direct influences of linguistic, religious and ethnic diversityon 
inequality are inevitable in the region. Religion and ethnic diversity were found to be 
statistically significant at their conventional levels. The findings also revealed that the 
indirect influence fail to attenuate the level of income disparity within an interactive 
regression framework. By implication, the adverse effects of the three components 
ofdiversity remain intact when institution index and its interaction with diversity measures 
are added. Two main policy implications can be inferred from the findings: (a) the 
institutional infrastructures in the region have not been able to solve inequality problems 
orchestrated by ethnic diversity. Therefore, there is need for the region to restructure the 
institutional settings to tackle the byproducts of ethnic differences that are politically 
motivated by selfish individuals or groups which threaten national unity. (b) Meaningful 
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gains from liberalization within and across the region, financial supports to the less-
privileged, high literacy and guaranteeing fair playing ground to all citizens will go a long 
way to dampen uneven wealth distribution in the region.  
It may not be surprising if institutions in SSA cannot effectively modulate the effect of ethnic 
diversity on inequality. This is essentially because institutions instead of playing the role of 
policy variables may reflect policy syndromes. In other words, institutions may reflect 
negative signals instead of positive signals. This is essentially the case when the institutional 
variables are negatively skewed. This narrative on the assimilation of negative skewness to a 
policy syndrome is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016d) who have predicted the 
occurrence of the 2011 Arab Spring from institutional indicators in Africa that are negatively 
skewed. In the light of this clarification, the role of institutions in modulating the effect of 
ethnicity on inequality can be tailored to effectively reduce inequality by improving the 
following factors that are not mutually exclusive: (a) the election and replacement of political 
leaders (i.e. voice & accountability and political stability); (b) the formulation and 
implementation of sound policies that deliver  public commodities (i.e. government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and (c) the respect by the  State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them (i.e. corruption-control and the rule of law).  
Future studies can use alternative measures of the variables of interest (i.e. institutional 
quality, inequality and ethnic diversity) to assess whether the established findings withstand 
further empirical scrutiny. Moreover, comparative studies within an intercontinental 
framework would provide lessons from best performers to their least-performing counterparts. 
Country-specific studies are also worthwhile for more targeted policy implications. 
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Appendix 
  
  
Figure 2(a-d): Scatter plots of Income Inequality of the four Regions of SSA Countries. 
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Figure 2(a): Scatter Plot of Income Inequality of Southern African Countries
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Figure 2(b): Scatter Plot of Income Inequality of Central African Countries
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Figure 2(c): Scatter Plot of Income Inequality of Eastern African Countries
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Figure 2(d): Scatter Plot of Income Inequality of Western African Countries
